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OPERATIONS OF THE 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY, 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE), IN THE AIRMOBILE ASSAULT OF LANDING ZONE X-RAY, 1A DRANG VALLEY, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, 14-16 NOVEMBER 1965. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A COMPANY COMMANDER.)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
TABLE OF CONTENTS -----	1
PREFACE -----	3
INTRODUCTION -----	4
The Existing Situation -----	6
The Battalion Plan and Preparations -----	8
NARRATION	
The Initial Assault -----	12
Securing the LZ and Initial Enemy Contact -----	13
1st Attack to Reach Surrounded Platoon and	
Defense of the LZ -----	16
2nd Attack to Reach Surrounded Platoon -----	19
Establishing the Perimeter -----	21
Resupply and Evacuation Activities -----	22
Activities During the Night of 14-15 Nov -----	24
Enemy Attacks on 15 Nov -----	26
The Rescue of the Surrounded Platoon -----	29
The Second Night, 15-16 Nov -----	30
The Final Day -----	31
Extraction from LZ X-RAY -----	32
Summary -----	33
Operation Statistics -----	35
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM -----	36
LESSONS LEARNED -----	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	42

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont)

TAB A --- Map of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Area of Operations

TAB B --- Organization and Equipment Outline, Infantry Battalion,
Airmobile Division

TAB C --- Reconnaissance Flight Route

TAB D --- Operations Order, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry

TAB E --- Battalion Dispositions, 1400 Hours, 14 Nov

TAB F --- Battalion Dispositions, 1545 Hours, 14 Nov

TAB G --- Organization of Perimeter, 1st Night, 14-15 Nov

TAB H --- Enemy Attacks on 15 Nov

TAB I --- Attack to Rescue Surrounded Platoon

TAB J --- Organization of Perimeter, 2nd Night, 15-16 Nov

TAB K --- Enemy Attacks on Morning of 16 Nov

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PREFACE

The operation portrayed in this monograph was a small, but highly significant phase of a much larger operation known as the "PLEIKU CAMPAIGN" conducted by units of the 1st Cavalry Division (AIRMOBILE) from 23 October to 25 November 1965.

Information on the events preceding and following those described in this monograph may be found in two detailed after action reports. The attack on the Plei Me camp, and the operation to relieve the camp is covered in "COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT", (MACV/RCS/J3/32), Headquarters, Special Tactical Zone 24, Advisory Detachment, APO US Forces 96499. The "PLEIKU CAMPAIGN" as conducted by units of the 1st Cavalry Division (AIRMOBILE) is outlined in "OPERATIONS REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, 3-66 - THE PLEIKU CAMPAIGN", Headquarters, Department of the Army, 10 May 1966.

Special acknowledgement is given to the "AFTER ACTION REPORT, LA DRANG VALLEY OPERATION, 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY, 14-16 NOVEMBER 1965", Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division(AIRMOBILE), APO San Francisco 96490. Despite my presence on the battlefield as C Company Commander, I was not familiar with many actions that occurred throughout the battalion area. These missing links were supplied by this very comprehensive report prepared by Colonel Harold G. Moore, Jr., Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.

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INTRODUCTION

In mid October 1965 the Special Forces camp at Plei Me (ZA164058) (TAB A), located approximately 35 kilometers south of Pleiku, was attacked by a large North Vietnamese Army force. Subsequent intelligence identified these forces as the 32nd and 33rd North Vietnamese Regiments. (6:10) It was believed that these units were newly infiltrated from North Viet Nam, and that they had a twofold mission in attacking the camp: First, an introduction to battle for their troops; and second, the destruction of any relief force committed to assist the besieged camp.

As a result of the heavy concentration of enemy forces in the area, the South Vietnamese II Corps Commander decided to commit his Corps reserve forces to the battle. This action seriously depleted the defense of the vital Pleiku airbase complex. To bolster the defenses of this important logistical installation, the Commanding General, Field Forces Viet Nam, on 22 Oct, ordered the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division(AIRMOBILE) to deploy elements of the 1st Air Cav Div from its base at An Khe to the Pleiku area. The mission assigned these elements was to assist in the defense of installations at Pleiku, and to prepare to reinforce II Corps forces in the relief of the Plei Me camp. (6:19) This initially small commitment grew larger, and the role of the 1st Air Cav Div was expanded, when additional intelligence concerning the size and composition of the enemy forces was developed.

The operation discussed in this monograph occurred after the initial division mission had been changed to that of finding, fixing, and destroying enemy forces in the area of operations.

By 25 Oct the Plei Me camp had been relieved, and the enemy was withdrawing west to its base area located in the Chu Pong Mountain complex. (YV9099) (TAB A) The enemy forces massing in

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this area were later identified as the two regiments previously listed, and a third regiment - the 66th; all operating under the control of a Field Front Headquarters. This Headquarters is the equivalent of a United States Army Division Headquarters. (6:13) The westward movement of the 32nd and 33rd Regiments (the 66th was not committed to the Plei Me camp battle) was subjected to constant harrassment by units of the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, then operating in the area. Numerous enemy contacts were made, and the enemy suffered extensive losses of men, material, and equipment. On 9 Nov the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, assumed responsibility for the conduct of operations in the area. For the next four days search and destroy operations were conducted north, south, and east of the Plei Me camp with little enemy contact. Then came the turning point, and the crucial days that followed.

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THE EXISTING SITUATION

ENEMY

General: By 11 Nov US units had relaxed their pursuit of the enemy and were searching east of Plei Me. Sensing this, the Field Front Headquarters controlling enemy units in the area decided to stage another attack on the Plei Me camp. (6:130) Although the 33rd Regiment had suffered heavily in the previous fighting, the 32nd Regiment, and particularly the 66th Regiment remained in excellent condition for battle. Accordingly, these forces, all massed in the Chu Pong Mountain - Ia Drang Valley area, began preparations for the new attack. The estimated strength of all enemy forces on 14 Nov was 3631. (6:11)

Special: The individual enemy soldier encountered in the fighting at Landing Zone(LZ) X-RAY was well trained, aggressive, an expert in the art of camouflage, and seemingly fanatical in his desire to close with American forces. A large number of enemy troops were armed with automatic weapons. Ammunition was in sufficient supply to sustain the enemy in a heavy engagement. Each man carried 2-3 potato masher type hand grenades, and other standard field equipment. The morale of the enemy seemed generally good, as evidenced by the small number of prisoners captured.

FRIENDLY The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (AIRMOBILE), was organized as an Infantry Battalion, Airmobile Division under TO&E 7-55T. Located at TAB B is an organizational and equipment outline of the battalion as authorized in November 1965.

WEATHER The weather during the period favored airmobile operations. The sky was clear, and visibility was unrestricted. There was no precipitation during the operation, and the temperature remained between 76^o and 86^o Fahrenheit. The moon was full, and the resulting light favored night operations and security.

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TERRAIN The ground in and around LZ X-RAY was flat. A moderate number of trees of varying sizes bordered the actual LZ. Thick, dry grass, one to five feet in height was located throughout the area. This severely limited effective observation for personnel positioned in foxholes or prone shelters. Scattered throughout the area were large mounds of dirt (ant hills) overgrown with scrub trees and brush. Along the western edge of the LZ, and near the base of the mountain, the trees and grass were especially thick.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT The abundant vegetation in the vicinity of the LZ afforded excellent concealment. Cover was provided by the ant hills, and dry creek beds near the LZ.

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THE BATTALION PLAN AND PREPARATIONS

By 13 Nov it was obvious that the enemy was not located in force to the north, south, or east of Plei Me. Accordingly, at approximately 1700 hours, 13 Nov, the Commanding Officer, 3rd Bde, issued an oral order to the Commanding Officer, 1-7 Cav to conduct a helicopter assault into the Ia Drang Valley, north of Chu Pong Mountain, early on 14 Nov with a mission of conducting search and destroy operations in area LIME (TAB A) through the 15th. Fire support was to be provided from LZ FALCON (ZA023032) (TAB A) by two batteries of 105mm howitzers, one battery of which would have to be moved by air from Plei Me on the 14th, prior to the air assault. A Co, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion was to provide the helicopter lift.

The Battalion Commander formulated his plan, assembled his staff, completed his coordination, and issued a warning order to the battalion. Activities which were to be completed early on 14 Nov included:

(1) the airlift of B Co from its location at the 3rd Bde CP as a security/reaction force back to rejoin the battalion at Plei Me.

(2) the assembling by A and C Cos of their platoons at the best pick up zone in their respective company sectors.

(3) a first light aerial reconnaissance of the objective area.

A time of 0830 hours, 14 Nov, was set for the issuing of the order at the Bn CP.

The actual and authorized strengths of the companies when committed to the area are shown below:

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	<u>Committed 14 Nov</u>		<u>Authorized by TO&E</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>
Co A	5	115	6	164
Co B	5	114	6	164
Co C	5	106	6	164
Co D (Cbt Spt)	4	76	5	118

Not included are those elements of Headquarters Company that participated in the action. These included staff officers, liaison officers, medical personnel, and communications personnel. In addition, the companies had attachments of artillery forward observer teams, medical aidmen, and engineer demolition specialists. The personnel shortages in the lettered companies were the result of malaria victims, R&R quotas, and personnel being discharged. Additionally, each company had personnel back at the base camp at An Khe as guards, and area improvement/development details.

By 0630 hours, 14 Nov, B Co, which was to be the initial assault company, had returned to Plei Me by CH47 "CHINOOK" helicopters. The location of the battalion elements, as disposed in the vicinity of Plei Me at 0700 hours, 14 Nov, is shown at TAB A.

The same aircraft that moved B Co immediately commenced moving A Btry, 1st Bn, 21st Arty to LZ FALCON according to plan.

The personnel scheduled to make the aerial reconnaissance assembled, were briefed, and took off. The Bn CO; Bn S-3; Artillery Liaison Officer; B Co Commander; CO, A Btry, 1-21 Arty; Scout Section Leader, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry; and the CO, A Co, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, composed the reconnaissance party. The reconnaissance party utilized two UH1D helicopters, with two UH1B helicopter gunships as escort. The reconnaissance was conducted with a maximum of deception to prevent alerting the

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enemy to the battalion's intentions. The flight route used is depicted at TAB C. One south to north pass at an altitude of 4500 feet was made with the aircraft continuing north past Duc Co. Here the aircraft orbited for five minutes, then flew south over generally the same flight route at the same altitude, and returned to Plei Me at approximately 0815 hours. At this time the remainder of the commanders and staff had assembled to receive the order.

The reconnaissance produced three tentative LZs - designated TANGO, X-RAY, and YANKEE. (TAB A) Reconnaissance party personnel agreed that TANGO was the least desirable, being the smallest and ringed with tall trees. The Bn CO tentatively selected X-RAY as the primary LZ, and sent the Scout Section Leader, C Troop 1-9 Cav to make a low level flight up the valley to gain additional information on the two LZs, and to look for signs of enemy activity. Meanwhile the Bn CO issued an oral operations order. The order was later reduced to writing, and appears at TAB D. Present to receive this order were all the company commanders; the battalion staff and special staff officers; the CO, A Co, 229th Assault Helicopter Bn, and his liaison officer to the 1-7 Cav; the CO, A Btry, 1-21 Arty; and the 3rd Bde S-3. During the issuance of the order the Scout Section Leader returned from his reconnaissance and reported the following information:

(1) LZ YANKEE was spotted with stumps, and would be a difficult LZ.

(2) LZ X-RAY was suitable, and could take eight to ten UH1D helicopters at a time.

(3) The only sign of enemy activity was a strand of communications wire along an east-west trail, north of X-RAY.

(4) No enemy fire was directed at the helicopters during this reconnaissance.

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Based on this information the Bn CO decided to use LZ X-RAY as the primary LZ, and LZ YANKEE as the alternate. The 3rd Bde CO arrived during the issuing of the order, and was later briefed by the Bn CO.

The artillery reported that it was in position, and the Bn CO established a time of 1030 hours for the assault landing. Details of the artillery preparation are included in the copy of the operations order at TAB D.

All commanders returned to their units to complete their planning and issue their orders. With only 16 UH1D helicopters available, and a shuttle lift schedule in effect, there was sufficient time for all preparations.

Battalion personnel were well rested, well equipped, and had excellent morale. Individuals carried the following combat load:

(1) 300 rds 5.56mm ammunition, or 24-36 rds 40mm, HE ammunition, or 800 rds 7.62mm Machinegun ammunition, depending on the individual's basic weapon.

(2) 2-3 fragmentation grenades per individual.

(3) 2 66mm, M-72 LAWs per squad.

(4) 5-6 smoke grenades per platoon.

(5) Individual clothing and equipment, consisting of combat pack, two canteens, entrenching tool or machete, ammunition pouches, first aid packet, and a small sleeping roll.

(6) One C-Ration meal per individual.

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THE INITIAL ASSAULT

Last minute problems caused a delay in the start of the artillery preparation, which finally began at 1017 hours. Aerial observers reported that the rounds were well placed on the LZ, in the trees and high grass around the LZ, and on the finger and draw leading down from the high ground northwest of the LZ. The artillery fire lifted, and the UH1B helicopters of the Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion (ARA) made a firing pass of the LZ, expending half of their load of rockets (24, 2.75 inch HE, Rockets), and then commenced an on-call orbit near-by. The gunships accompanying the lift ships preceded the landing with suppressive fire from their machineguns and rockets. The door gunners of the lift ships also contributed suppressive fire with their machineguns. The initial landing of B Co elements occurred at 1048 hours. The Bn CO and his command group (the Bn SMAJ, Bn S-2, two radio operators, and a Vietnamese interpreter) landed with the leading elements of B Co. Operating from a command helicopter in orbit over the area were the Bn S-3, the Artillery Liaison Officer, the Helicopter Liaison Officer, and the Air Force Forward Air Controller. This group furnished aerial radio relay, coordination and control of supporting fires, and aerial observation throughout the day until darkness forced them to land at X-RAY.

B Co received no enemy fire on landing, and commenced operations to secure the LZ. The lift ships immediately departed to pick up the remainder of B Co, and the lead elements of A Co.

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SECURING THE LZ AND INITIAL ENEMY CONTACT

Immediately upon landing, B Co dispatched the rifle squads of one platoon on a quick reconnaissance of the LZ. These squads moved off the LZ in different directions for a distance of 50-100 meters. The B Co Commander assembled the balance of his company as a striking force in a wooded area adjacent to the LZ. At 1120 hours one of the squads captured a prisoner. This individual was unarmed, carried an empty canteen, and was dressed in dirty khaki clothes with a serial number on one of his shirt epaulets. When interrogated he stated that he was a member of the North Vietnamese Army, that he had only eaten bananas for five days, and that there were three battalions on the mountain above the LZ that wanted very much to kill Americans, but had been unable to find any. (1:4) The prisoner was then evacuated to the 3rd Bde CP in the battalion command helicopter.

Based on this information the Bn CO ordered the B Co Commander to concentrate his reconnaissance efforts in the area where the prisoner was taken, and to prepare to assume the C Co mission of searching the lower portion of the mountain, particularly the finger and draw to the northwest. By now it was about 1210 hours, and those elements of A Co that had landed assumed the LZ security mission from B Co. The A Co landing, like the initial landing, was unopposed.

By approximately 1220 hours B Co was making scattered contact with enemy riflemen near the mountain. B Co was directed to assume the C Co mission, and to develop the situation. As B Co started this task, the Bn CO alerted A Co to be prepared to follow B Co when sufficient forces from C Co had arrived to assume the LZ security mission.

At approximately 1245 hours the leading elements of B Co became engaged in a fire fight of moderate intensity. By 1330 the

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B Co Commander reported that he was being heavily attacked by two enemy companies, and that his right (north) platoon was in danger of being surrounded and cut off from the remainder of the company. As the fight in the B Co sector developed, a few rounds of mortar fire began to strike the LZ and portions of B Co.

The remaining elements of A Co, and the lead elements of C Co were landing about the time B Co reported the presence of two enemy companies. A Co was ordered to move up on the left (south) flank of B Co, establish physical contact with this flank, and protect it. Additionally, A Co was directed to send one platoon to B Co to assist in preventing the B Co right flank platoon from being cut off.

C Co was directed to establish a blocking position off the LZ to the south and southwest. From this position C Co was to prevent the LZ from being attacked, and to protect the A Co left flank.

The Bn CO then contacted the command helicopter and issued instructions to his fire support liaison officers. Air strikes were requested in the following priority: on the lower portion of the mountain, on the mountain itself, and on enemy approaches into the LZ from the west and south. Similar target areas were designated for the artillery and ARA. Priority of fires were to go to requests from the rifle companies. In the absence of such requests, fire was to be placed on suspected enemy locations in the target areas outlined above. Accurate placement of supporting fires was a serious problem to everyone. The terrain and heavy vegetation prevented pinpoint location of friendly units. B Co was experiencing the most problems, for by now, the right flank platoon was separated from the rest of the company, and could not precisely locate itself to benefit from the available fire support.

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This platoon was fighting a moving battle against an estimated 75-100 enemy. A and B Cos, unsure of the location of the separated platoon, were unable to bring artillery fire in front of their units to assist their movement. Instead, the artillery fire was placed well up on the mountain to the west and south, and then gradually "walked" down until it gave some support to these companies, especially A Co. Air strikes were delivered northwest of the LZ, and on the suspected location of an enemy battalion reported by higher headquarters the previous day. (YA903032) (TAB A)

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1ST ATTACK TO REACH SURROUNDED PLATOON AND DEFENSE OF THE LZ

The platoon of A Co sent to assist B Co engaged the enemy prior to reaching its destination, and when finally making contact with B Co found itself on the B Co right flank rather than the left as directed by the A Co Commander. This situation caused some confusion until the exact location of this platoon was determined. B Co, with the platoon of A Co, pushed forward in an attempt to reach the separated B Co platoon. This attack managed to get within 75-100 meters of the B Co platoon, but the enemy, positioned in force between the attacking units and the B Co platoon, was inflicting moderate casualties, and stopped the attack short of its objective.

Meanwhile, A Co(-) was moving toward the left flank of B Co when it made contact with an estimated enemy company that was moving along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of the LZ. This route led directly into the left rear elements of B Co. A Co engaged the enemy and was able to inflict heavy casualties with only light casualties on the friendly side. For some unknown reason the enemy, apparently determined to maintain its movement toward the rear of B Co, kept moving into the massed fires of A Co. (1:5) Two prisoners were taken by A Co, and later evacuated.

As A Co engaged the enemy, the remaining platoons of C Co, and the lead elements of D Co landed. The helicopters were taken under enemy fire as they landed, and although several personnel were killed and wounded, no helicopters were shot down. Hearing this, the Bn CO stopped the lift of additional battalion elements until a later time.

The C Co Commander positioned his platoons along side the elements that had landed earlier. C Co had no sooner completed its hasty organization of the blocking position to the south and southwest when a force of 175-200 enemy, headed for the LZ, struck

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this area. This force was taken under fire by C Co, and the attack halted. For the next hour and a half, C Co fought the enemy in this sector, and with the assistance of artillery and ARA fire was able to defeat the attack and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. One prisoner was captured, and evacuated during this battle.

The elements of D Co that landed with C Co included the Company Commander, his command group, the Antitank Platoon (organized as a rifle platoon), and part of the Mortar Platoon. Upon landing this force headed for the sounds of the fight in the A Co area. As they reached the dry creek bed, D Co ran into 25-30 enemy, again moving in the creek bed. D Co fought this enemy force, and assisted by elements of A Co, killed most of the enemy. During the fight the D Co Commander and the Mortar Platoon Leader were seriously wounded, but continued fighting until the enemy withdrew. The D Co Commander relinquished command to the Antitank Platoon Sergeant, (the senior man present), and was then evacuated. At this time the disposition of the battalion was as depicted in TAB E.

The C Co Commander, at the conclusion of the D Co fight, contacted the NCO commanding D Co personnel, and with the permission of the Bn CO, positioned them on the left(southeast) flank of C Co to provide added protection to the LZ.

At this time the Bn CO estimated that the battalion was fighting a force of 500-600 enemy, with others probably nearby. This fact, together with the numerous casualties suffered by the battalion, prompted the Bn CO to request an additional rifle company from the 3rd Brigade Commander. The request was approved, in fact the Bde CO had anticipated the need for reinforcements, and had previously alerted B Co, 2nd Bn, 7th Cav for possible commitment to the area. (1:6)

By approximately 1500 hours it was felt that as a result of the fighting by C and D Cos, the remainder of the battalion elements,

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previously diverted from landing, could be brought in with a minimum of danger. These forces, 3 UH1D loads of C Co personnel, and several loads of D Co personnel, were landed without incident. The D Co Executive Officer arrived with these ships and assumed command of D Co. He positioned the Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon on the eastern edge of the LZ. He then assumed control of the rifle company mortars (previously consolidated on the eastern side of the LZ by the C Co Commander), and adding the mortars from D Co, formed a composite mortar platoon. The mortars were oriented toward the A and B Co sectors, with the mortarmen also responsible for the defense of a portion of the LZ near their positions.

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2ND ATTACK TO REACH SURROUNDED PLATOON

It was now approximately 1545 hours. The disposition of the battalion is shown at TAB F. The surrounded platoon of B Co had moved with its dead and wounded to a small rise of ground, and established a 25 meter wide perimeter. The platoon had fought off all enemy attempts to defeat it. A and B Cos, under cover of heavy artillery fire, withdrew slightly, evacuated their casualties, and prepared for a coordinated attack to reach the surrounded platoon. The battle in the C Co area was in its closing stages.

At 1620 hours A and B Cos launched the second attack to reach the surrounded platoon. This attack was supported by massed artillery and ARA fire. The enemy, despite constant bombardment by artillery, air strikes, and ARA, had become well entrenched in the area between the attacking companies and the surrounded platoon. The enemy made maximum use of the terrain and vegetation to provide cover and concealment for its positions. Snipers occupied the trees, and numerous automatic weapons were emplaced behind the ant hills in the area.

A and B Cos were able to make only slight progress in the direction of the surrounded platoon. A Co gained at most 150 meters, while B Co was held to a 75-100 meter advance. The enemy was inflicting numerous casualties on the attacking friendly units. A Co had lost all three rifle platoon leaders, either KIA or WIA, plus its artillery forward observer. The enemy almost succeeded in drawing one of A Co's rifle platoons into a trap. By falling back in front of this platoon, and holding in front of others, the enemy soon had this platoon in front of the other advancing elements. Then the enemy attempted to maneuver a force behind this leading platoon. This move was detected, and under cover of white phosphorous artillery fire that seemed to disorganize the enemy,

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the platoon was able to fall back and rejoin A Co. So ended the second attempt to reach the B Co platoon.

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ESTABLISHING THE PERIMETER

At 1740 hours with an estimated 200 enemy fighting against A and B Cos, the Bn CO ordered these companies back to the LZ to establish a defensive perimeter for the night that was fast approaching. The surrounded platoon was still in radio contact with B Co, and was holding firm against the enemy. Surprisingly, this platoon was to suffer no additional casualties before being reached the next day. The radio link enabled friendly artillery to establish a ring of protective fire around the platoon whenever the need arose.

Activity was now concentrated on the establishment of a strong defensive perimeter. Water and ammunition resupply had to be accomplished. A and B Cos had suffered numerous casualties, and had to evacuate them. Reorganization was required in both companies because of the high number of leader casualties suffered during the day. C Co, in fighting from a hasty defensive position, had not suffered excessive friendly casualties, and was in good shape. The enemy had ceased his attacks in this sector, but maintained contact with snipers and harassing fire. D Co, after its initial losses, had not sustained further casualties.

Between 1705 and 1800 hours, B Co, 2-7 Cav arrived in the LZ, and occupied a position on the perimeter to the northeast. One platoon of B Co, 2-7 Cav was attached to C Co, 1-7 Cav, since C Co had a relatively wide sector to defend. This platoon was positioned on the right flank of C Co.

The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon was placed in battalion reserve near the Bn CP. The perimeter was complete by 1900 hours, and defensive fires were being registered. Organization of the perimeter for the first night is depicted in TAB G.

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RESUPPLY AND EVACUATION ACTIVITIES

As the battle raged around and adjacent to the LZ, other activities were in progress. The immediate problem was the care and evacuation of casualties. At approximately 1400 hours the battalion surgeon, four aid station personnel, and limited medical supplies arrived in the LZ. They immediately established an aid station in the vicinity of the Bn CP, and commenced treatment of casualties. With the LZ under heavy fire during most of the afternoon, medical evacuation helicopters were used for only the most seriously wounded. The Bn CO coordinated with the helicopter company commander, and arranged a system of strict control over aircraft landing in the LZ. (1:7) Each aircraft coming into the LZ was required to contact the Bn CP for permission to land, and specific landing instructions. The approach altitude, direction, and landing area for each aircraft was prescribed, and was varied for each landing to prevent the enemy from detecting a set pattern. In-bound aircraft informed the Bn CP of the exact load they carried, and in turn the aircraft were told whether casualties were to be picked up for evacuation to the rear Bn CP. This system worked well, for it kept to a minimum the amount of time the aircraft were on the ground, and it utilized to the fullest extent, the capabilities of the aircraft. Unless absolutely necessary no ship went out of the LZ empty.

As a result of the careful control of aircraft, only two helicopters were damaged seriously enough to prevent their taking off from the LZ after landing. These aircraft were secured by elements of D Co, and recovered by CH47 "CHINOOKS" two days later.

The Bn CO realized by 1530 hours that a night landing capability in the LZ was required. He contacted the lift company commander, and requested pathfinder assistance. The lift company

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commander had foreseen such a requirement, and shortly thereafter a pathfinder team and engineer demolition specialists arrived in the area. The pathfinders assumed control of the movement of aircraft, while the engineers worked to improve the landing area. By dark a relatively safe, two ship, night landing zone was in operation.

Utilizing the LZ discussed above, a resupply of ammunition, water, rations, and medical supplies was delivered. In addition the Bn CO instructed the Bn S-3, Artillery Liaison Officer, and Forward Air Controller, (all still operating from the command ship) to land as soon as possible. Their landing, like others in the early evening, was hampered and delayed by a heavy curtain of dust, smoke, and haze that had gathered over the area.

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ACTIVITIES DURING THE NIGHT OF 14-15 NOVEMBER

With the perimeter established, the battalion commenced activities designed to defend the LZ, and to prepare for the next day's actions. Artillery concentrations were adjusted on all sides of the perimeter. Resupply was accomplished, and units reorganized their chains of command to counteract the loss of leaders and other key personnel. Morale was high, the men knew they had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. For most personnel this was their first experience in heavy combat, and they were pleased to know that they could and did perform well.

The enemy conducted several small probes of the perimeter during the night, but all were quickly detected and defeated. These probes were conducted by groups of 5-10 enemy, apparently attempting to detect the location of the battalion's automatic weapons. Strict fire discipline was maintained, and the only weapons used to fire against the probes were M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers. The artillery continued to fire throughout the night on all suspected enemy locations around the perimeter, and on the mountain above the perimeter.

The rapid pace of battle during the day prevented the construction of proper individual shelters. With the establishment of the perimeter came an attempt to dig some type of positions. Prone shelters were hastily constructed. Extensive digging was not undertaken for several reasons. First, it was not known if the enemy had the capability of launching a night attack, therefore strict noise discipline was maintained to assist in detecting enemy movement toward the perimeter. Second, the tall grass in the area partially blocked observation, and deep foxholes would have increased the observation problem. Other than close in local security, no listening posts or other security positions were

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established. The heavy vegetation and the threat of immediate enemy attack made the establishment of distant outposts impossible. In addition protective artillery concentrations were being fired within 100-150 meters of the perimeter and this fire would have endangered friendly security positions.

The surrounded platoon of B Co was holding on despite enemy attempts to overrun it. Priority of fires was given to B Co, and any call for fire to assist the isolated platoon was immediately answered. The enemy could be heard moving around the surrounded platoon, and each time the enemy seemed to be massing for an attack the platoon called for artillery fire. On several occasions screams and shouts from the enemy attested to the effect of this supporting fire.

Throughout the night an Air Force flare ship was in the vicinity awaiting illumination missions. On one occasion an air strike on the mountain was conducted using the flare ship illumination for control. The strike was right on target. Illumination was not used again, since the light seemed to expose the men in the perimeter of the surrounded platoon as well as the positions within the battalion perimeter.

With the appearance of dawn at about 0630 hours, plans were made to launch an attack to reach the surrounded platoon. The Bn CO called for the company commanders to meet him at the C Co CP (the best vantage point to observe the area) to finalize plans for the attack. The Bn CO first directed that each company patrol forward of its positions in a search for infiltrators and snipers.

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ENEMY ATTACKS ON 15 NOVEMBER

The violence that characterized the fighting on the first day erupted anew at 0650 hours of the second day, 15 Nov. The patrols from the 2nd and 1st Platoons of C Co (the left or southeastern two platoons) each consisted of one rifle squad accompanied by the platoon leader. These patrols had moved about 150-200 meters in front of their positions in the search for enemy snipers and infiltrators when both patrols began receiving heavy small arms fire. They returned the fire, and started back for their positions. At this time the enemy launched a vicious attack at the C Co sector with a force of two to three companies. The patrols from the other two platoons of C Co (the 3rd Platoon, and the attached 2nd Platoon, B Co, 2-7 Cav) received some enemy fire, probably an overlap from the firing to their left. They too started back for the company sector. The patrols from the 2nd and 1st Platoons suffered numerous casualties before they reached their defensive positions. This seriously depleted the strength of the platoons defending the left portion of the C Co area, and this was where the brunt of the enemy attack struck. The patrols from the other two platoons were able to reach their positions without casualties. A heavy fight quickly developed in the C Co sector, with the bulk of the struggle centering in the area of 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Platoons (from left to right), and in front of the Co CP. The enemy pressed his attack, and despite intense fire from artillery, ARA, TAC Air, and small arms, reached the perimeter positions in the C Co area. This was to be the limit of his advance. The men of C Co stood their ground. Close range, at times hand to hand fighting continued to rage in the C Co sector for the next two hours.

The enemy also attacked the battalion perimeter in the D Co area (at about 0715 hours), and the A Co area (at about 0800 hours),

in an attempt to penetrate the position. These attacks were conducted with smaller forces than that thrown against C Co, and were repulsed by the defenders in the respective company areas. The attack in the D Co area forced the Bn CO to commit the battalion reserve (Bn Recon Platoon) to insure the safety of the LZ. The reserve joined the fight in the D Co area, and after defeating the enemy attack occupied a position in that area. These additional enemy attacks did succeed in bringing the LZ under heavy grazing fire of such volume that movement anywhere within the LZ was extremely hazardous, and the landing of helicopters was prevented until approximately 0910 hours.

At 0715 hours the C Co Commander (wounded early in the fighting, but continuing to command for three hours) requested reinforcements from the Bn CO. The action prompting this request for assistance was the penetration of the enemy to within hand grenade distance of the C Co CP. The Bn CO ordered a platoon from A Co to move to the C Co area. This maneuver was undertaken at about 0745 hours. With the LZ under attack from several directions, and movement very difficult, this platoon did not reach C Co for approximately one hour.

The Bn CO having committed his reserve, and in light of the heavy enemy attacks, and the losses being inflicted on the battalion, requested another rifle company from 3rd Bde. (1:10) This reinforcement (A Co, 2-7 Cav) was already standing by, but was not moved until the LZ was determined safe for landing.

C Co, with attachments, continued to battle the enemy in a series of savage encounters. The intensity of the fighting in the C Co sector is reflected in the following examples:

- the 1st Platoon Leader was found KIA with five dead enemy in and around his position.

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- one man was found KIA with his hands around the throat of a dead enemy soldier.

- all C Co officers were casualties by 0800 hours, two KIA and three WIA.

- in the vicinity of the company CP, some 50 meters inside the perimeter, the company command group killed 15-20 enemy.

At approximately 0910 hours, the leading elements of A Co, 2-7 Cav began arriving in the LZ. The A Co Commander was oriented on the situation and terrain, and was then ordered to take over positions previously held by B Co(-), 2-7 Cav. B Co(-), 2-7 Cav moved to the C Co, 1-7 Cav area, assumed control of the remaining C Co forces, and continued the defense of the sector.

By 1000 hours the enemy attack had been defeated. Reorganization, resupply, and evacuation activities were undertaken and completed. At 1300 hours the units on the perimeter swept the area out to a distance of 300 meters. Evidence of the destruction dealt the enemy was everywhere. Dead enemy were scattered throughout the area, weapons, equipment, bandages, and bloody trails littered the ground. Two enemy prisoners were also captured. C Co, 1-7 Cav was then positioned as battalion reserve near the Bn CP. The enemy attacks on the morning of 15 Nov are shown at TAB H.

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THE RESCUE OF THE SURROUNDED PLATOON

With the perimeter re-established, and the enemy withdrawn, attention turned to the task of reaching the surrounded platoon of B Co. The 2nd Bn, 5th Cav, which the 3rd Bde CO positioned at LZ VICTOR (TAB A) late on 14 Nov, commenced a foot move toward X-RAY at 0800 hours, 15 Nov, and succeeded in reaching X-RAY at about 1205 hours. The Bn COs conferred, and decided on the following plan. A and C Cos, 2-5 Cav, with B Co, 1-7 Cav, under control of CO, 2-5 Cav, would conduct a coordinated attack to reach the surrounded platoon. The route and disposition of forces for this attack are shown at TAB I. The CO, 1-7 Cav assumed control of B Co, 2-5 Cav, and was responsible for the defense of the LZ during the rescue operation.

The attack to reach the surrounded platoon was launched at 1315 hours, after a heavy fire support preparation. The enemy offered little resistance, and the platoon was contacted at 1510 hours. They had suffered 8 KIA, 12 WIA, and 7 unwounded. There was still ammunition available, and the men were in good spirits.

The units moved back to X-RAY, and the perimeter was established for the second night. Organization of the defense is shown at TAB J. Resupply and similar administrative activities were completed.

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THE SECOND NIGHT, 15-16 NOV

During a relatively quiet afternoon the troops occupying the perimeter made extensive improvements in their individual positions. This effort was to pay dividends, for the enemy was not finished with the American force in X-RAY.

The perimeter remained quiet until 0100 hours, 16 Nov, when a five man enemy probe was launched at the sector held by B Co, 1-7 Cav. The enemy threat was detected and two enemy killed. Fire discipline remained excellent, as it had on the first night. Artillery fire was utilized to protect the perimeter as had been done on the first night.

The enemy commenced small probing action against the area defended by B Co, 2-7 Cav at 0400 hours. At 0422 hours an enemy force of 250-300 troops attacked this area, the same area that had been struck on the morning of the 15th. This attack was discovered, and return fire delayed until the enemy was clearly within small arms range. Then the company retaliated with its small arms, automatic weapons, and massed artillery fire from the four batteries now supporting the LZ. The enemy was repulsed, but not finished. Another attack was launched against the same area at 0430 hours. This attack was quickly defeated. At 0500 hours the enemy tried again with 100 men from a more southwesterly direction. This attack also failed to penetrate the perimeter. At 0630 hours the enemy made a final unsuccessful attack, striking again from a southerly direction. B Co, 2-7 Cav had conducted a magnificent defense. Constant illumination from an Air Force flare ship, and later from mortar and artillery shells seemed to confuse the enemy, for each time a flare illuminated the area the enemy would hit the ground or attempt to hide in the grass and trees, thus disrupting the momentum of his attack. The locations of the enemy attacks on the morning of 16 Nov are shown at TAB K.

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THE FINAL DAY

At 0655 hours a coordinated "mad minute" was fired by all units in LZ X-RAY. This consisted of all personnel firing small arms and automatic weapons into the trees, and possible hiding places of the enemy in front of their positions. This action was intended to prevent a recurrence of the previous morning's assault by the enemy at the perimeter. The tactic was apparently successful for as soon as the firing began an enemy force of 30-50 men jumped to their feet 150 meters in front of A Co, 2-7 Cav, and began firing their weapons. Artillery fire was called on this enemy force, and the enemy was driven off. In other areas several enemy dropped from trees close to the perimeter positions.

Orders were next issued for all units to conduct, on order, a sweep of the area out to a distance of 500 meters. This was ordered executed at 0955 hours, but after moving only 50-75 meters, B Co, 2-7 Cav began receiving enemy fire. All units pulled back to the perimeter, and artillery and TAC Air was again called on the area surrounding the perimeter. At the completion of this strike the units continued the sweep, killing 27 enemy in the process. Like the sweep after the battle the previous morning, grim evidence of the heavy casualties suffered by the enemy force was discovered.

By 1200 hours the remainder of the 2nd Bn, 7th Cav had landed at X-RAY, and was preparing to relieve 1-7 Cav. The 3rd Bde Commander ordered the CO, 1-7 Cav to move his battalion, plus B Co, 2-7 Cav, and the 3rd Platoon, A Co, 2-7 Cav to LZ FALCON by UH1D.

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THE EXTRACTION FROM LZ X-RAY

The remaining units in LZ X-RAY manned the perimeter while the 1st Bn, 7th Cav with attachments, was extracted by UH1D helicopter. Additionally, artillery fire and TAC Air strikes on the mountain above X-RAY were utilized to keep the enemy from interfering with the movement. To minimize the time the aircraft remained on the ground during the pick up, strict control was again established. Not until the personnel were spotted on the LZ, broken down into separate plane loads, were the aircraft called in. By 1500 hours the movement to LZ FALCON was complete. By 1830 hours all elements of the battalion with attachments had been further moved by air from FALCON to Camp Holloway, vicinity Pleiku airbase, for two days of rest and reorganization.

SUMMARY

The examination of any military operation would be incomplete if an effort were not made to show how the particular operation contributed to the overall military effort. In this regard, there are several factors that should be considered to fully appreciate the significance of the three day battle in LZ X-RAY:

(1) The operations of the 1st Bn, 7th Cav in LZ X-RAY represented, at that stage of the United States' involvement in Viet Nam, the first major engagement between a large US force, and units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army.

(2) The ability of the individual American soldier to fight and defeat the NVA enemy was vividly demonstrated in a series of savage encounters. "The invasion army of North Viet Nam found itself beaten in land combat for the first time in 15 years, and by an Army that its propagandists claimed was weak, ineffective, and decadent." (6:215)

(3) The techniques and tactics of Army Air Mobility, as developed and practiced by units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, were subjected to the test of sustained combat, and passed with flying colors. Relying entirely upon aerial resources, the 1st Bn, 7th Cav entered a hostile area, rapidly massed men and fire support to defeat a numerically superior enemy on his own ground, and conducted all logistical activities necessary to support the combat effort.

(4) The 1st Bn, 7th Cav, with the support of massed artillery and close air support, was credited with the near annihilation of the 7th and 9th Battalions of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment, plus the remnants of the 33rd Regiment. (6:214) It is certain that these staggering losses, combined with the casualties inflicted on the enemy by other units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division,

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seriously disrupted the enemy's long range plans for the conquest of the vital Central Highlands area of South Viet Nam. (6:215)

OPERATION STATISTICS

CASUALTIES

	<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>FRIENDLY</u>
KIA	834 (Body Count) 1215 (Estimated)	KIA	79
WIA	No Estimate Made	WIA	125
POW	6	MIA	0

ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED AND EVACUATED

Assault Carbines	54
Assault Rifles	57
Automatic Rifles	17
Heavy Machine Guns	4
Rocket Launchers	5
Pistols	2
82mm Mortars	2
Medical Kits	6

ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED IN OBJECTIVE AREA

Miscellaneous Crew Served and Individual Weapons	100
Anti Tank Rockets	9
Hand Grenades	300-400
Assorted Ammunition	7000 Rds
Entrenching Tools	100-150

NOTE There are minor differences in the statistics contained in the various after action reports. The figures listed here are taken from "Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 3-66 - The Pleiku Campaign" since it is the more recent of the reports.

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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The principles of war as outlined in FM 100-5, FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS OPERATIONS, provide a valuable aid in the analysis of this operation.

The ultimate objective of war - the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to resist - was the sole objective of the operation. The battalion was searching for the enemy, and was intent on inflicting maximum punishment on him when he was discovered. The high number of enemy casualties is ample evidence of the successful accomplishment of this mission by the battalion.

Offensive action was achieved by initiating an attack in an area long recognized as an enemy base. The offensive thrust disrupted the enemy's attack plans, and caused him to destroy much of his fighting strength in a series of futile attempts to dislodge the battalion from its positions in the landing zone.

The principles of mass, and economy of force will be discussed simultaneously, since they are so closely related. The battalion initially constituted a relatively small force searching for the enemy. When contact was made, and it became apparent that a degree of massing was required, additional units were moved to the area. The helicopter must be recognized as the most important factor in the battalion's success in applying the principles of mass, and economy of force. Using the helicopter, a small force can cover a large area. Upon making contact with the enemy, mass can quickly be achieved through the use of the helicopter to move units rapidly to the critical point.

Maneuver is evident in several instances. First, the sudden appearance of the battalion on the enemy's home ground forced the enemy into the position of defending its base from a potential threat. This gave the battalion a tactical advantage by requiring

the enemy to fight under unfavorable circumstances. Second, the ability of the individual companies to rapidly change from their original missions, once the situation developed, proved an important factor in the final outcome of the battle.

Unity of command was established from the beginning of the operation. The battalion commander was solely responsible for the actions of all units in the landing zone. Additional resources that were put into the area came under his control. The battalion commander reported to, and responded to orders from one superior headquarters, the 3rd Brigade.

A constant flow of information on the enemy's movements and activities was supplied by the pilots of the numerous aircraft flying over the area. In this manner a high degree of security was achieved. Likewise, positioning forces in a complete perimeter around the landing zone prevented the enemy from gaining a tactical advantage, and thus maintained the battalion's vital link with outside assistance.

Surprise was definitely another factor that contributed to the success of the operation. Before the enemy knew what was happening, a strong American force had landed and established a position from which it could not be moved. By the time the enemy had reacted in sufficient strength to make the landing of additional troops impossible, there were enough friendly forces on the ground to protect the landing zone. Then, with the support of almost unlimited fire power, the friendly force commenced inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

Any airmobile operation is, by its very nature, a complex combat operation. Simplicity must be gained through the utilization of a ground tactical plan that does not involve complex maneuvers. The battalion attempted to do this in formulating its

tactical plan. An additional consideration in applying the principle of simplicity is the status of training of the unit, and the familiarity of personnel with airmobile operations. Fortunately the majority of the officers and men of the battalion had been working with the airmobile concept since July 1964, and were completely familiar with the techniques and tactics.

In the analysis of this operation there are two important points that, above all others, contributed to the successful accomplishment of the battalion's mission.

(1) The coordinated utilization of all available means of fire support turned the tide of battle in favor of the battalion in the conduct of this operation against a numerically superior enemy force. The fact that the Battalion S-3, Artillery Liaison Officer, and Forward Air Controller were co-located in the command helicopter, was a principle factor in the success of the fire support effort. These individuals were in a position to closely supervise and coordinate all fire support means. This close association was maintained on the ground when these officers landed in the objective area.

(2) The ability of the companies of the battalion to rapidly execute tactical maneuvers on the battlefield retained the initiative for the battalion, and B Company's initial thrust toward the enemy when contact was established, placed the battalion on the offensive. Had B Company delayed in this movement, the battalion could well have been trapped on the LZ from the very start. The swift movement of A Company to assist B Company certainly prevented a potential disaster by intercepting the enemy force driving into the rear of B Company. C Company, in quickly establishing a blocking position, and repelling the enemy attack from the southwest, prevented the enemy from capturing the landing zone.

In a more critical sense, there are two areas that should be examined.

(1) The failure of the intelligence agencies to more accurately estimate the potential enemy threat in the area is important. The enemy strength was such that, had he been able to react more rapidly to the landing, he could have easily overwhelmed the friendly force in the landing zone before sufficient troop strength was available to defend against his attack.

(2) The failure, on the first night, to sacrifice noise discipline in order to dig better shelters, and clear fields of fire, was the cause of a number of additional casualties on the morning of the 15th when the enemy attacked in strength.

The enemy must also be credited with some favorable achievements. The enemy made excellent use of the available cover and concealment by positioning his snipers in well concealed areas, and digging his automatic weapons into the bases of the ant hills. In this manner the enemy was able to make the terrain work to his advantage. The accuracy of the enemy marksmen was excellent. A high percentage of friendly casualties were officers, other leaders, and radio operators. All were apparently especially selected sniper targets because of their important function of command and control.

One unfavorable aspect of the enemy should be noted. The enemy continued to use a mass attack formation against the same area of the perimeter after repeatedly being turned back. It would appear, the enemy lacked either the flexibility to divert units from a previously selected course of action, or the command and control facilities to influence the action once it had commenced.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Units must be cautious in their pursuit of enemy forces.
An often used enemy tactic is to fall back in front of an advancing friendly unit in order to lure it into a position where a second, concealed enemy force can move behind the friendly force and cut it off from its parent organization. "Walking" artillery fire in front of a pursuing friendly force is of assistance in preventing such a trap.
2. There exists a need for units occupying a perimeter to be able to mark the trace of the perimeter at night with some sort of illumination device that will permit aircraft to fire in support of the perimeter.
3. A carefully controlled "mad minute" (a form of reconnaissance by fire) is a successful method of triggering an enemy attack by causing the enemy to expose himself prematurely.
4. The security of a unit's flanks must be a continuous process, particularly in an area where there are no fixed battle lines.
5. Leaders at all levels must be made aware of the value of close defensive artillery fire. Too often leaders were reluctant to use close-in artillery fire for fear that friendly casualties would result. This misconception must be removed from the minds of combat leaders and the personnel of their commands. Artillery fire is the infantryman's most available and powerful means of influencing the action.
6. A unit conducting an air assault operation must first concern itself with holding the LZ that links it with outside assistance. The higher headquarters of the unit making the assault must retain the ability to rapidly reinforce the committed unit should it require assistance. It is highly unlikely that a unit in heavy contact with the enemy would be able to execute an extractions from a LZ.

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7. Units preparing defensive perimeters during the hours of darkness must sacrifice noise discipline to dig proper individual shelters and clear fields of fire.
8. Pathfinder teams should always accompany battalion-size units on air assault operations. These teams provide aircraft control, and thereby free the battalion CP of the requirement to handle this important task. This permits the battalion CP to concentrate on tactical operations.
9. Personnel must be trained to exercise caution when going to the assistance of wounded men. In many cases additional casualties were suffered when personnel were too anxious to assist wounded personnel. Taking time to analyze the situation, eliminate enemy positions in the area, or at a minimum having other personnel provide covering fire would greatly reduce the danger of suffering additional casualties when assisting wounded men.
10. Co-locating all personnel connected with obtaining and directing the various fire support means insures close, continuous fire support from all available agencies.

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
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
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
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XEM CHỈ TỪ PHÍA CAO MIỀN Ở KẾ CẬN LOẠI

LEGEND - CHỈ TỪ
MAP INFORMATION AS OF 1965
BẢN ĐỒ TÍN TỨC NĂM 1965

On this map a LANC is considered as being a minimum of 2.4 to 18 feet in width. Trên bản đồ này một LỐI XE ĐI ĐƯỢC CÒN NHỎ HƠN 2.4 mét.


Dense forest or jungle indicates more than 25 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally impassable on foot. Clear forest indicates more than 25 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally passable. Loại rừng rậm rậm rạp rậm rạp che phủ hơn 25% diện tích mặt đất. Rừng thưa chỉ rừng cây thưa rậm rạp che phủ dưới 25% diện tích mặt đất. Rừng thưa chỉ rừng cây thưa rậm rạp che phủ dưới 25% diện tích mặt đất. Rừng thưa chỉ rừng cây thưa rậm rạp che phủ dưới 25% diện tích mặt đất.

WHEN REFERRING TO POPULATED PLACE NAMES, INCLUDE UTM GRID COORDINATES



CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 METI
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10 METI

SPHEROID
GRIP 1:600 METER UTM ZONE 48 (1) A LACK NUM



FOR CAMBODIA LEGEND SEE ADJOINING SERIES
XEM CHỮ TỰ PHA CAO MIỀN Ở KẾ CÁN LOẠI

LEGEND - CHỮ TỰ
MAP INFORMATION AS OF 1965
BẢN ĐỒ TÍN TỨC NĂM 1965

On this map a LANE is considered as being a minimum of 2.4 m. (8 feet) in width. Trên bản đồ này một LỐI XE ĐI đã được coi như rộng ít nhất là 2.4 mét

Dense forest or jungle indicates more than 75 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally impassable on foot. Clear forest indicates more than 25 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally passable on foot. Vegetation classified by office identification from aerial photography. rừng rậm hay rừng già chỉ rừng cây bụi phủ mặt đất trên 25%, lớp thành vòm cây kín và phần dưới rừng có thể qua lại được. Rừng thưa chỉ rừng cây bụi phủ mặt đất trên 25%, lớp thành vòm cây kín và phần dưới rừng có thể qua lại được. Thảm thực vật phân loại theo ảnh chụp

WHEN REFERRING TO POPULATED PLACE NAMES, INCLUDE UTM GRID COORDINATES

ROADS - ĐƯỜNG - SÁ

All weather, hard surface, two or more lanes wide	2 LANES 2 LỐI XE ĐI
Đường tráng nhựa, có hai hay nhiều hơn hai làn xe đi	
All weather, loose or light surface, two or more lanes wide	3 LANES 3 LỐI XE ĐI
Đường tráng nhựa, bề mặt lỏng lẻo, có hai hay nhiều hơn hai làn xe đi	
All weather, loose or light surface, one lane wide	
Đường tráng nhựa, bề mặt lỏng lẻo, chỉ một làn xe đi	
Fair or dry weather, same surface - Đường đất	
Chỉ trong thời tiết khô ráo, cùng bề mặt - Đường đất	
Seasonal track - Đường mòn, đường không	
Đường mòn, đường không	

ROUTE MARKERS - DẤU HIỆU ĐƯỜNG SÁ

Highway intersection	
Đường quốc lộ, đường quốc lộ	
Provincial, Communal or other	
Thị trấn, huyện lỵ, huyện lỵ	

RAILROADS - ĐƯỜNG XE LỬA

Normal gauge, single track, 1 meter (33%) wide, Station	
Loại đường thường, một đường, rộng 1 mét, Ga, trạm	
Normal gauge, double track	
Loại đường thường, hai đường	
Narrow gauge, single track	
Loại đường hẹp, một đường	

Airfield - Sân bay, Seasonal

Sân bay, Mùa khô, sân bay	
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
BRIDGES

Wood - Cầu gỗ	
Steel - Cầu sắt	
Concrete - Cầu bê tông	
Fordbridge - Cầu nhỏ	
Ferry - Phà	
Ford - Cầu lợp que	
Road on levee - Đường đắp	
Levee, dike - Bùn đắp, Tường	

Canal or ditch, Less than 18 meters wide, Over 18 meters wide
Kênh hay mương đào: Rộng dưới 18 mét; Rộng trên 18 mét

Built up area - Tròn thị	
Village - Làng	
Church, Christian shrine, School	
Nhà thờ, Thờ, trường học	
Temple, Pagoda, Minor palace	
Đền, miếu, Cung điện	
Post office, Telegraph, Telephone	
Mưu cơ, Trạm điện, Điện thoại	
Cemetery - Nghĩa địa	
Fort, Ruins - Lũn, Tàn tích	
Horizontal control point	
Điểm kiểm soát	
Spot elevation in meters, Checked, Unchecked	
Ca dao, điểm cao, kiểm tra, không kiểm tra	
Chỉ được kiểm tra	
International boundary - Ranh giới Quốc gia	
Phân giới - Ranh giới Phân	
Tỉnh boundary - Ranh giới Tỉnh	
Delegation boundary - Ranh giới Quận	
Area name	
Tên vùng hay địa điểm	

Salt evaporator	
Huỳnh muối	
Limestone mountain	
Núi đá vôi	
Sand - Cát	
Large rapids	
Chướng chảy mạnh	
Large falls	
Thác lớn	
Small falls	
Thác nhỏ	
Dense forest or jungle	
Rừng rậm hay rừng già	
Clear forest	
Như rừng	
Plantation: Tea	
Trà, đồn điền	
Rice Swamp	
Rừng lầy, Đầm lầy	
Land subject to incursion	
Đất có thể lấn	
Nipa, Mangrove	
Đầm nước, Cây lùn	
Coffee, Rubber	
Cà phê, Cao su	
Palm, Brushwood	
Cây dừa, Rậm	
Pine, Bamboo	
Thông, Tre	



CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 M
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10

SPHEROID
GRID 1:000 METER UTM, ZONE 48, BLACK
ZONE 49, BLUE
PROJECTION
VERTICAL DATUM
HORIZONTAL DATUM

CREDITS
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NAMES BY
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REFER CORRECTIONS TO THIS MAP TO COMMANDING OFFICER, AIR
KINH GHI NHỮNG SỰ SỬA ĐỔI TRONG BẢN ĐỒ NÀY ĐẾN NHÀ

DELINEATION OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES MUST NO
ĐƯỜNG BIÊN GIỚI QUỐC GIA TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ CHƯA


DELINEATION OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES
RANH GIỚI HÀNH CHÍNH TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ NÀY CHỈ PHẠC

GLOSSARY - CỜ TỰ

Chữ	primary administr
Khiết	la
Phai	FOR OFF
Ph (Phum)	
Prak	
Srok	secondary administr


PLAYBOY

Pr E2 G1040 (DJK) 3 xM





Scale Tỷ lệ 1:50,000




CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 METERS
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10 METERS



KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ: 20 MÊT
CÁC VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ PHỤ TÙNG 10 MÊT

SPHEROID

EVEREST

ELEVATION GUID
CỬI ĐẪN CAO-ĐỘ





CONTOUR INTERVAL - 20 METERS
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTOURS - 10 METERS

SPHEROID EVEREST
 GRID 1,000 METER UTM: ZONE 48 (BLACK NUMBERED LINES); ZONE 49 (BLUE NUMBERED TICKS)
 PROJECTION TRANSVERSE MERCATOR
 VERTICAL DATUM MEAN SEA LEVEL AT HA TIEN
 HORIZONTAL DATUM INDIAN DATUM 1960

KHOẢNG CÁCH ĐỀU VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ: 20 MÉT
CÁC VÒNG CAO-ĐỘ PHỤ TÙNG: 10 MÉT

KHU VỰC HẸM ĐƯỢC
 Ở VÙNG
 KHU HÌNH THOI 49 CHƯNG MẮC ĐƯỜNG GHI SỐ XANH
 HỆ THỐNG CHẾ ĐỘ
 BÌNH DIỆN CHUYỂN
 HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU CHUẨN

EVEREST
 UTM TỪNG 1,000 MÉT KHU HÌNH THOI 48
 (NHỮNG ĐƯỜNG CÓ CHỈ SỐ XANH)
 U.T.M.
 MẶT BIỂU TRUNG BÌNH TẠI HÀ TIÊN
 HỆ THỐNG TRẮC CẦU ẤN ĐỘ 1960

CREDITS

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 XIN GHI NHỮNG SỰ SỬA ĐỔI TRONG BẢN ĐỒ NÀY ĐẾN NHÀ PHÂN PHỐI QUỐC GIA, ĐÀ LẠT, VIỆT NAM

DELINEATION OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED AUTHORITY
 ĐƯỜNG BIÊN GIỚI GHI TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ CHƯA ĐƯỢC MINH HẠCH

DELINEATION OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES IS APPROXIMATE
 HẠNH GIỚI HÀNH CHÍNH TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ NÀY CHỈ PHẠC HÓA VỚI TÍNH CÁCH ĐẠI CƯƠNG

GLOSSARY - CỜ-TỬ

Chư	mountain
Khê	primary administrative division
lạ	river, stream
Plei	settlement
Ph (Phuon)	settlement
Prak	stream
Srok	secondary administrative division



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TO CONVERT A MAGNETIC AZIMUTH TO A GRID AZIMUTH
 SUBTRACT G.M. ANGLE
 MUỐN ĐỔI PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ THÁNH PHƯƠNG "ÁP C" VƯỢNG THỰC GÓC V-T

TO CONVERT A GRID AZIMUTH TO A MAGNETIC AZIMUTH
 ADD G.M. ANGLE
 MUỐN ĐỔI PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ VƯỢNG THÀNH PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ CỘNG THÊM GÓC V-T

TO CONVERT A MAGNETIC AZIMUTH TO A GRID AZIMUTH
 ADD G.M. ANGLE
 MUỐN ĐỔI PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ THÁNH PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ CỘNG THÊM GÓC V-T

TO CONVERT A GRID AZIMUTH TO A MAGNETIC AZIMUTH
 SUBTRACT G.M. ANGLE
 MUỐN ĐỔI PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ VƯỢNG THÀNH PHƯƠNG-GIÁC TỰ TRỪ GÓC V-T



FL. YI


SHEET 6536 NAM 1:50,000


EDITION 1-
XUẤT-BẢN LẦN 7

PLEI LOUNG 5.5 KM SERIES L7014

PLEI GAO LANG 3.5 KM

791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804






ELEVATION GUIDE
CHỈ DẪN CAO ĐỘ



BOUNDARIES
NHỮNG ĐỊA GIỚI



ADJOINING SHEETS
HÀNG RÁP ĐỊA ĐỒ

6436 I L7016	6536 IV	6536
6436 II L7017	6536 III	6536
6436 III L7018	6536 II	6536
6436 IV L7019	6536 I	6536

LEGEND - CHÚ THÍCH
MAP INFORMATION AS OF 1965
HÀNG ĐỒ TÍN TỨC NĂM 1965

On this map a LANE is considered as being a minimum of 2.4 m. (8 feet) in width. Trên bản đồ này một LỐI ĐI ĐƯỢC coi như rộng ít nhất 2,4 m. (8 feet) trong chiều rộng.

Dense forest or jungle indicates more than 25 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally impassable on foot. Clear forest (and then 25 percent of ground is concealed by canopy with undergrowth generally passable on foot. Vegetation classified by other identification from aerial).


Hàng rừng rậm hoặc rừng già chỉ rừng rậm hơn 25% diện tích mặt đất bị che phủ bởi tán rừng, dưới tán rừng thường không thể đi bộ được. Hàng rừng rậm hoặc rừng già chỉ rừng rậm hơn 25% diện tích mặt đất bị che phủ bởi tán rừng, dưới tán rừng thường không thể đi bộ được. Hàng rừng rậm hoặc rừng già chỉ rừng rậm hơn 25% diện tích mặt đất bị che phủ bởi tán rừng, dưới tán rừng thường không thể đi bộ được.

WHEN REFERRING TO POPULATED PLACE NAMES, INCLUDE UTM GRID COORDINATES. THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESES FOLLOWING A POPULATED PLACE NAME INDICATES MORE THAN ONE PLACE IS SO NAMED WITHIN THE MAP SHEET AREA.

Build-up area: Thôn, xã
School: Trường
Church, Christian school, School: Nhà thờ, Trường học, Trường học
Jungle, Pagoda, Minh pagoda: Chùa, đền, miếu

ST
AN
NI
UT
N
EN
WAT

HIGHEST
VIETNAMESE
English
COMPARABLE
U.S. UNIT
State
County




36 NAM 1:50,000

014 5
17 45
743 5 45

EDITION 1-AMS
XUAT-BAN LẦN THỨ 1-AMS

XUONG KUANG




XUONG KUANG

SHEET 6536 II

1:50,000

HORIZONTAL SCALE 1:50,000



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LESSONS LEARNED

1. Units must be cautious in their pursuit of enemy forces.
An often used enemy tactic is to fall back in front of an advancing friendly unit in order to lure it into a position where a second, concealed enemy force can move behind the friendly force and cut it off from its parent organization. "Walking" artillery fire in front of a pursuing friendly force is of assistance in preventing such a trap.
2. There exists a need for units occupying a perimeter to be able to mark the trace of the perimeter at night with some sort of illumination device that will permit aircraft to fire in support of the perimeter.
3. A carefully controlled "mad minute" (a form of reconnaissance by fire) is a successful method of triggering an enemy attack by causing the enemy to expose himself prematurely.
4. The security of a unit's flanks must be a continuous process, particularly in an area where there are no fixed battle lines.
5. Leaders at all levels must be made aware of the value of close defensive artillery fire. Too often leaders were reluctant to use close-in artillery fire for fear that friendly casualties would result. This misconception must be removed from the minds of combat leaders and the personnel of their commands. Artillery fire is the infantryman's most available and powerful means of influencing the action.
6. A unit conducting an air assault operation must first concern itself with holding the LZ that links it with outside assistance. The higher headquarters of the unit making the assault must retain the ability to rapidly reinforce the committed unit should it require assistance. It is highly unlikely that a unit in heavy contact with the enemy would be able to execute an extraction from a LZ.

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7. Units preparing defensive perimeters during the hours of darkness must sacrifice noise discipline to dig proper individual shelters and clear fields of fire.
8. Pathfinder teams should always accompany battalion-size units on air assault operations. These teams provide aircraft control, and thereby free the battalion CP of the requirement to handle this important task. This permits the battalion CP to concentrate on tactical operations.
9. Personnel must be trained to exercise caution when going to the assistance of wounded men. In many cases additional casualties were suffered when personnel were too anxious to assist wounded personnel. Taking time to analyze the situation, eliminate enemy positions in the area, or at a minimum having other personnel provide covering fire would greatly reduce the danger of suffering additional casualties when assisting wounded men.
10. Co-locating all personnel connected with obtaining and directing the various fire support means insures close, continuous fire support from all available agencies.

Robert H. Edwards
ROBERT H. EDWARDS
Captain, Infantry

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2. Coffey, Raymond R., "The Battle of Ia Drang - History Calls It A Victory," Chicago Daily News (Foreign Service Syndicated Newspaper Story), 20 November 1965.
3. "Combat Operations After Action Report, (MACV/RCS/13732)," (Headquarters, Special Tactical Zone 24, Advisory Detachment, APO US Forces, 96499). (CONFIDENTIAL)
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5. "Fury at Ia Drang: Now the Regulars," "Paying the Price," Newsweek, pgs 21 and 22, 29 November 1965.
6. "Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 3-66 - The PLEIKU Campaign," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 10 May 1966).
7. "The Valleys of Death," Time, pg 32, 26 November 1965.

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Map of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Area of Operations

TAB B

**Organization and Equipment Outline, Infantry Battalion,
Airmobile Division**

INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV (TOE 7-55T)


OR

AIRBORNE INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV

MISSION:--To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to Airmobile Division, TOE 67T.

CAPABILITIES:--a. Close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to capture or destroy him. b. Repel enemy assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. c. Provide base of fire and maneuver elements. d. Seize and control terrain for limited periods of time. e. Conduct independent operations on a limited scale. f. Provide communications, reconnaissance, indirect fire, antitank and limited logistical support. g. Conduct long-range patrolling. h. Participate in air assault operations. i. Participate in airborne and air assault operations when organized as an airborne battalion. j. Maneuver in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.



RECAPITULATION:

VEHICULAR:

Trk cgo 3/4-T 4x4 w/wa.	2
Trk plat util 1/2-T 4x4	19
Trk util 1/4-T 4x4	5
Trk util 1/4-T carrier for 106RR	8
Tlr cgo 3/4-T 2 whl	2
Tlr cgo 1/4-T 2 whl	9
Utility vehicle 2 whl	2

ARMAMENT:

Launcher grenade 40mm	86
Mortar 81mm on mount	13
Rifle 90mm	18
Rifle 106mm on mount	8
Machine gun 1t flex	20
Rifle 5.56mm XM16E1	540
Pistol auto cal .45	227

COMMUNICATIONS:

Radio set AN/GRC-106 mtd in 1/4-T trk	1
Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd in 1/4-T trk	9
Radio set AN/PRC-6	60
Radio set AN/PRC-25	74
Radio set AN/PRC-41	1
Radio set AN/PRC-47	5
Radio set AN/VRC-24	1
Radio set AN/VRC-46	1
mtd in 1/4-T trk	1
Radio set AN/VRC-49 mtd in 1/4-T trk	1
Radio set control group AN/GRA-39	6
Radio set control group AN/GRA-74	2
Radio teletypewriter set AN/VSC-2	1
Comm cen AN/ARC-122	2
Swbd tel man SB-993/GT.	6
Swbd tel man SB-22/PT	3
Telephone set TA-1/PT	45
Telephone set TA-312/PT	54
Metascope asmbly image infrared tranzd.	16


TAB B PERC 2

HQ AND HQ CO, INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV OR AIRBORNE INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV (TOE 7-56)

MISSION:--To provide command, staff supervision, communications, medical, and limited combat service support for Infantry Battalion, Airmobile Division.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to the Inf Bn, Airmobile Div, TOE 7-55 or the Airborne Inf Bn, Airmobile Div, TOE 7-55.

CAPABILITIES:--a. Provides command, control, staff planning, and supervision of operations of organic and attached elements of the Infantry Battalion, Airmobile Division. b. Provides limited combat service support for assigned and attached units. c. Provides communications to higher and subordinate headquarters. d. Maneuvers in all types of terrain. e. Provides unit level medical treatment and evacuation for assigned and attached units. f. Provides organizational maintenance for all assigned vehicles. g. Provides mess facilities for all assigned units.



BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt Col Battalion Comdr 1542 11
1 Maj XO 1542 40
1 Maj S3 2162 11
1 Capt Comm Off 0200 41
1 Capt S1 Adj 2110 11
1 Capt S2 9301 43
1 Capt S4 4010 44
1 SMaj Sergeant Major 11050 45

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt Company Comdr 2900 11
1 SSgt First Sergeant 11050 11
1 SSgt Supply Sergeant 76K40
1 SP4 Armorer 76K30
1 SP4 Company Clerk 71H20
1 Pfc Rac Tel Op 11B10

BATTALION HQ SECTION

1 Capt S3 Air 2163 43
2 Lt Liaison Officer 1542 11
1 MSgt Intelligence Sgt 11F40
1 MSgt Ops Sgt 11F40
1 SFC A Ops Sgt 11F40
1 SFC Per Staff NCO 71H40
1 SSgt Chemical NCO 54E40
1 SP4 Clerk Typist 71B30
1 SP4 Ops Asst 11F20 51
1 Pfc Mail Del Clerk 91A10

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
Util veh 2 whl 2
Trk amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 1
Machine gun lt flex 1

COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON

1 SFC Comm Chief 31F40
1 Sgt Chief Rad Op 05B40
1 Sgt Rad TT Team Ch 05C40
1 Sgt Wire Team Chief 31F40
2 SP5 Sr Radio Mech 31B20
2 SP4 Radio Mech 31B20
2 SP4 Radio TT Op 05C20 57
1 SP4 Sr Message Clk 36A10
3 SP4 Sr Radio Op 05B20
1 SP4 Sr Smbd Op 36A10
1 SP4 Sr Wireman 36A10
3 Pfc Message Clk 36A10
1 Pfc Messenger 36A10 01
4 Pfc Radio Op 05B20 57
1 Pfc Smbd Operator 36A10
3 Pfc Wireman 36A10
1 Pfc Asst Messenger 36A10

Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 3
Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 3
Control group AN/GRA-6 . . . 1
Radio set AN/CRG-106 1
mtd in 1/4-T trk 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 9
Radio set AN/PRC-41 1
Radio set AN/PRC-47 5
Radio set AN/VRC-24 1
Radio set AN/VRC-46 mtd 1
in 1/4-T trk 1
Radio set AN/VRC-49 mtd 1
in 1/4-T 1
Radio set control group 6
AN/GRA-39 6
Radio set control group 2
AN/GRA-74 2
Radio teletypewriter set 1
AN/VSC-2 1
Smbd tel man SB-21/PT 2
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 24
Comm cent AN/ASC-5 1

SERVICE PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt Platoon Leader 4000 25

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION SEC

1 WO Section Leader 761A0
1 SFC Supply Sergeant 76K40
1 SSgt Ammo Chief 11B40
1 SSgt Asst Supply Sgt 76K40
4 SP4 Ammo Specialist 11B20
2 SP4 Supply Spec 76K20 12
1 SP4 Sr Lt Veh Driver 64A10
5 Pfc Lt Veh Driver 64A10
1 Pfc POL Handler 56A10
1 Pfc Supply Clerk 76A10

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . 6
Launcher grenade 40mm 2
Machine gun lt flex 1
Metascope asmb image
infrared transd 1

MAINTENANCE SECTION

1 Sgt Maintenance Sgt 63B40
1 SP4 Eq Report Clk 71B20 12
1 SP4 Rep Part Sp 76D20
2 SP4 Whl Veh Mech 63B20
2 Pfc Lt Trk Drvr 64A10
1 Pfc Whl Veh Mech H 64A10

Trk cgo 3/4-T 4x4 w/w 2
Tlr cgo 3/4-T 2 whl 2
Launcher grenade 40mm 1

MESS SECTION

1 SFC Mess Sgt 94F40
4 SSgt Asst Mess Sgt 94B40
6 SP5 First Cook 94B20
5 SP4 Cook 94B20 12
5 Pfc Cook's Nlpr 94B10 56

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . 2
Launcher grenade 40mm 5

MEDICAL PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt Platoon Leader 3100 52
1 Lt Medical Op Asst 3506
1 SFC Platoon Sergeant 91B40
2 Pfc Radio Tel Co 91A10

Radio set AN/PRC-25 2

AID STATION AND EVACUATION SEC

1 SSgt Section Sgt 91B40
2 SP4 Medical Asst 91C20
2 SP5 Sr Med Aidman 91B30
8 SP4 Med Aidman 91B30 42

AIDMAN SECTION

12 SP5 Company Admn 91B20 11

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifle
5.56mm XM16E1 unless other-
wise indicated.


01 Also lt truck driver.
05 Also troop education NCO.
11 Armed with pistol automatic
cal .45.
12 Armed with launcher grenade
40mm and pistol automatic cal
.45.
25 Also asst S4. Remark 11 ap-
plies.
36 Also commands communica-
tions platoon.

RIFLE CO, INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV
OR
RIFLE CO, AIRBORNE INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV
(TOE 7-57T)

MISSION:--To close with the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to the Infantry Battalion, Airmobile Division, TOE 7-55, or the Airborne Infantry Battalion, Airmobile Division, TOE 7-55.

CAPABILITIES:--a. Close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him. b. Provide a base of fire and maneuver elements. c. Seize and hold terrain. d. Maneuver in all types of terrain and climatic conditions. e. Capitalize on all forms of mobility. f. Conduct air assault operations. g. Conduct long range patrolling.



COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt	Company Comdr	1542	11
1 Lt	XO	1542	
1 SSgt	First Sergeant	11G50	
1 SSgt	Supply Sgt	76K40	
1 Sgt	Comm Chief	31F40	
1 SP4	Armorer	76K30	40
1 SP4	Company Clerk	71H20	12
1 SP4	Field Swbd Op	36A10	
1 SP4	Rad Mech	31B20	
2 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11B20	

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . . 1
Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 2
Radio set AN/PRC-6 . . . 2
Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 4
Swbd tel man SB-993/GT. . . 1
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 2
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 1

(3) RIFLE PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt	Platoon Ldr	1542
1 SFC	Platoon Sgt	11B40
1 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11B20

Flame thrower portable . . . 1
Radio set AN/PRC-6 . . . 2
Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 1
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 1
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 1

(9) RIFLE SQUADS

1 SSgt	Squad Leader	11B40
2 Sgt	Team Leader	11B40
2 SP4	Auto Rifleman	11B20 13
2 SP4	Grenadier	11B20 12
3 Pfc	Rifleman	11B10

Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 2
Radio set AN/PRC-6 . . . 1

(3) WEAPONS SQUADS

1 SSgt	Squad Leader	11B40
2 SP4	Gunner	11B20 11
2 SP4	Machine Gunner	11B20 11
2 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11B10
2 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11B10 11
2 Pfc	Asst Mach Gunner	11B10 11

Rifle 90mm 2
Machine gun lt flex. 2
Radio net AN/PRC-6 1

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1543
1 SFC	Platoon Sgt	11C40
3 Sgt	Foreward Obs	11C40
2 SP5	Fire Dir CMPT	11C20 41
2 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11C10 42

Trk platform util 1/4-T 4x4 . . . 1
Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 7
Swbd tel man SB-993/GT. . . 1
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 5

(3) 81MM MORTAR SQUADS

1 Sgt	Squad Leader	11C40 11
1 SP4	Gunner	11C20 11
3 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11C10
1 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11C10

Mortar 81mm on mt. 1
Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifle
5.56mm XM16E1 unless other-
wise indicated.


- 01 Also lt truck driver.
04 Also switchboard operator.
11 Armed with pistol automatic cal
.45.
12 Armed with launcher grenade
40mm and pistol automatic cal
.45.
13 Armed with rifle 5.56mm
XM16E1.
40 Remarks 01 and 12 apply.
41 Remark 12 applies to 1 EM.
42 Remark 01 applies to 1 EM.

COMBAT SPT CO, INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV
OR
COMBAT SPT CO, AIRBORNE INF BN, AIRMOBILE DIV (TOE 7-58T)

MISSION:--To provide reconnaissance, indirect fire support, and antitank support for the Infantry Bn or Abn Inf Bn, Airmobile Division.

ASSIGNMENT:--Organic to the Infantry Bn, Airmobile Division, TOE 7-55T or Airborne Inf Bn, Airmobile Div, TOE 7-55T.

CAPABILITIES:--a. Provides reconnaissance, indirect fire, and direct fire. b. Maneuvers in all types of terrain-climatic conditions.
c. Participates in air assault operations. d. Performs company level maintenance on organic equipment.



COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt Company Comdr 1542 11
 1 Lt XO 1542
 1 ISgt First Sergeant 11G50
 1 SSgt Supply Sergeant 76K40
 1 Sgt Comm Chief 31F40
 1 SP4 Armorer 76K30 01
 1 SP4 Company Clerk 71H20 12
 1 SP4 Wheel Veh Mech 63B20
 2 Pfc Rad Tel Op 11B10

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . 1
 Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 3
 Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 3
 Metascope asmbly image
 infrared tranzd 1

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON HQS

1 Lt Platoon Leader 1542
 1 SFC Platoon Sergeant 11F40
 2 Pfc Radio Tel Op 11B10

Radio set AN/PRC-25 2
 Metascope asmbly image
 infrared tranzd 2

(3) SCOUT SQUADS

1 SSgt Squad Leader 11F40
 1 Sgt Asst Squad Ldr 11F40
 4 SP4 Sr Scout Observer 11B20 43
 4 Pfc Scout Observer 11B10 41

Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 1

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt Platoon Leader 1543
 1 SFC Platoon Sergeant 11C40
 1 SSgt Fire Dir Chief 11C40
 3 Sgt Forward Obs 11C40
 3 SP5 Fire Dir Cmpt 11C30
 7 Pfc Rad Tel Op 11C10 44

Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 2
 Radio set AN/PRC-25 8
 Subd tel man SB-22/PT . . . 1
 Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 6

(4) HEAVY MORTAR SQUADS

1 Sgt Squad Leader 11C40 11
 1 SP4 Mortar Gunner 11C20
 5 Pfc Ammo Bearer 11C10
 1 Pfc Asst Gunner 11C10

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . 1
 Mortar 81mm on mount }

ANTI-TANK PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt Platoon Leader 1542
 1 SFC Platoon Sergeant 11H40
 1 Pfc Rad Tel Op 11H10

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
 Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 1
 Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
 in 1/4-T trk 1

(4) 106 RR SQUADS

1 Sgt Squad Leader 11H40
 2 SP4 Gunner 11H20
 2 Pfc Ammo Bearer 11H10
 2 Pfc Asst Gunner 11H10

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 carrier
 for 106mm rifle 8
 Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 4
 Rifle 106mm on mount 8
 Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
 in 1/4-T trk 8

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifle
 5.56mm XM16E1 unless other
 wise indicated.

- 01 Also lt truck driver.
 11 Armed with pistol automatic c
 .45.
 12 Armed with launcher grenade
 40mm and pistol automatic c
 .45.
 41 Remark 12 applies to 1 EM pe
 squad.
 43 Remark 45 applies to 3 EM (1
 per squad.

TAB C

Reconnaissance Flight Route

TAB D

Operations Order, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WRITTEN TRANSCRIPT OF 1st Bn, 7th Cav OPERATIONS ORDER

Copy # _____

HQS, 1st Bn, 7th Cav

Plei Me, RVN, ZA168069

140845 Nov 65

REFERENCE: Map, Viet Nam, 1:50,000, PLEI THE Sheet, #6551 IV
Series L701

1. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces:

- (1) Possible Battalion vic YA903032.
- (2) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mountain YA935010.
- (3) Possible secret base vic YA960020.

B. Friendly Forces:

- (1) 3rd Bde continues present mission of search and destroy.
- (2) 2nd Bn, 7th Cav south of Plei Me.
- (3) 2nd Bn, 5th Cav west of Plei Me.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 7th Cav conducts air assault operations in area LIME (Ia Drang Valley) to search for and destroy the enemy. Operations will be concentrated on stream beds, river beds, and wooded high ground to a maximum height of 500 meters.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Maneuver: The battalion will enter the area of operations by company elements, shuttling from their present locations using 16 UH1D helicopters, landing at Landing Zone X-RAY. Alternate Landing Zones are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only on order.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Company B will land first, and secure the LZ. The LZ will be secured using the technique of sending out reconnaissance elements from one platoon, and retaining the company(-) assembled as a striking force. Company A, Company C, and Company D will follow on order. Company B and Company A on order will assemble in attack formation off the north and northwest portion of the LZ, prepared to commence a coordinated searching movement to the east and northeast on order with Company A on the right (east). Company C initially Battalion reserve and LZ security on order. Prepare to move west and northwest to search lower portion of mountain area vic X-RAY.

- (2) Fire Support: There will be an 8 minute diversionary artillery preparation vic LZ YANKEE and TANGO, followed by a 20 minute artillery preparation vic the primary LZ X-RAY with emphasis on surrounding terrain and the finger and draw northwest of X-RAY. The tube artillery will be followed by 30 seconds of Aerial Rocket Artillery, followed by 30 seconds of gunship preparation just prior to touch down of the assault company. All mortars under Company D mortar platoon control. Position area to be selected after landing. Priority of fires initially to Company B, then to Company A when the move off the LZ to the east begins.

B. Company A:

C. Company B:

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

D. Company C:

E. Company D:

F. Headquarters Company: Move to LZ on order utilizing
2 CH 47's..

G. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Each rifle company be prepared to assume the mission of any other rifle company on order.
- (2) "C" lift frequency will be used.
- (3) All rifle companies take one mortar and maximum ammunition.
- (4) All mortars will be brought in as internal UHID loads and placed under Company D control.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- A. No mules will be taken into objective area until cleared to do so by the Battalion CO.
- B. Forward Supply Point will be at LZ FALCON ZA022032.
- C. Equipment left at Plei Me will be placed inside the Special Forces camp, prepared for air move to LZ FALCON or X-RAY on order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- A. Battalion Commander initially with assault company.
- B. Battalion Forward Command Post: LZ X-RAY at Battalion Commander's location.
- C. Battalion Rear Command Post: Present location initially. LZ FALCON on order.

MOORE

OFFICIAL:

LTC

/s/ DILLON

/t/ DILLON

S-3

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
TAB E

Battalion Dispositions, 1400 Hours, 14 Nov

Battalion Dispositions, 1345 Hours, 14 Nov

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY




Approximate Scale in Meters

BATTALION Dispositions
1400 HOURS 14 NOV
TAB E

LEGEND

[Symbol] = WOODED AREA BORDERING LANDING ZONE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

0 50 100 150 200 250
Approximate Scale in Meters

BATTALION DISPOSITIONS
1545 HOURS 14 NOV
TAB F


LEGEND

 = WOODED AREA BORDERING
LANDING ZONE

TAB G

Organization of Perimeter, 1st Night, 14-15 Nov

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT ROUTE

TAB C
-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt	Company Comdr	1542	11
1 Lt	XO	1542	
1 1Sgt	First Sergeant	11G50	
1 SSgt	Supply Sergeant	76K40	
1 Sgt	Comm Chief	31F40	
1 SP4	Armorer	76K30	01
1 SP4	Company Clerk	71H20	12
1 SP4	Wheel Veh Mech	63B20	
2 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11B10	

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . . 1
Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 3
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 3
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 1

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON HQS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1542	
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11F40	
2 Pfc	Radio Tel Op	11B10	

Radio set AN/PRC-25 2
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 2

(3) SCOUT SQUADS

1 SSgt	Squad Leader	11F40	
1 Sgt	Asst Squad Ldr	11F40	
4 SP4	Sr Scout Observer	11B20	43
4 Pfc	Scout Observer	11B10	41

Launcher grenade 40mm 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 1

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1543	
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11C40	
1 SSgt	Fire Dir Chief	11C40	
3 Sgt	Forward Obs	11C40	
3 SP5	Fire Dir Cmpt	11C30	
7 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11C10	44

Launcher grenade 40mm 2
Radio set AN/PRC-25 8
Swbd tel man SB-22/PT 1
Telephone set TA-312/PT 6

(4) HEAVY MORTAR SQUADS

1 Sgt	Squad Leader	11C40	11
1 SP4	Mortar Gunner	11C20	
5 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11C10	
1 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11C10	

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . . 1
Mortar 81mm on mount 1

ANTI-TANK PLATOON HEADQU

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1542	
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11H40	
1 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11H10	

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 1
Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
in 1/4-T trk 1

(4) 106 RR SQUADS

1 Sgt	Squad Leader	11H40	
2 SP4	Gunner	11H20	
2 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11H10	
2 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11H10	

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 carrier
for 106mm rifle 8
Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 4
Rifle 106mm on mount 8
Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
in 1/4-T trk 8

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifl
5. 56mm XM16E1 unless othe
wise indicated.

- 01 Also lt truck driver.
11 Armed with pistol automatic c
.45.
12 Armed with launcher grenade
40mm and pistol automatic c
.45.
41 Remark 12 applies to 1 EM pe
squad.
43 Remark 45 applies to 3 EM (1
per squad.

Reconnaissance Flight Route

TAB D

Operations Order, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WRITTEN TRANSCRIPT OF 1st Bn, 7th Cav OPERATIONS ORDER

Copy # _____

HQS, 1st Bn, 7th Cav

Plei Me, RVN, ZA168069

140845 Nov 65

REFERENCE: Map, Viet Nam, 1:50,000, PLEI THE Sheet, #6351 IV
Series L701

1. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces:

- (1) Possible Battalion vic YA903032.
- (2) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mountain YA935010.
- (3) Possible secret base vic YA960020.

B. Friendly Forces:

- (1) 3rd Bde continues present mission of search and destroy.
- (2) 2nd Bn, 7th Cav south of Plei Me.
- (3) 2nd Bn, 5th Cav west of Plei Me.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 7th Cav conducts air assault operations in area LINE (La Drang Valley) to search for and destroy the enemy. Operations will be concentrated on stream beds, river beds, and wooded high ground to a maximum height of 500 meters.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Maneuver: The battalion will enter the area of operations by company elements, shuttling from their present locations using 16 UH1D helicopters, landing at Landing Zone X-RAY. Alternate Landing Zones are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only on order.

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Company B will land first, and secure the LZ. The LZ will be secured using the technique of sending out reconnaissance elements from one platoon, and retaining the company(-) assembled as a striking force. Company A, Company C, and Company D will follow on order. Company B and Company A on order will assemble in attack formation off the north and northwest portion of the LZ, prepared to commence a coordinated searching movement to the east and northeast on order with Company A on the right (east). Company C initially Battalion reserve and LZ security on order. Prepare to move west and northwest to search lower portion of mountain area vic X-RAY.

- (2) Fire Support: There will be an 8 minute diversionary artillery preparation vic LZ YANKEE and TANGO, followed by a 20 minute artillery preparation vic the primary LZ X-RAY with emphasis on surrounding terrain and the finger and draw northwest of X-RAY. The tube artillery will be followed by 30 seconds of Aerial Rocket Artillery, followed by 30 seconds of gunship preparation just prior to touch down of the assault company. All mortars under Company D mortar platoon control. Position area to be selected after landing. Priority of fires initially to Company B, then to Company A when the move off the LZ to the east begins.

B. Company A:

C. Company B:

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

D. Company C:

E. Company B:

F. Headquarters Company: Move to LZ on order utilizing
2 CH 47's..

G. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Each rifle company be prepared to assume the mission of any other rifle company on order.
- (2) "C" lift frequency will be used.
- (3) All rifle companies take one mortar and maximum ammunition.
- (4) All mortars will be brought in as internal UHED loads and placed under Company D control.

4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.**

- A. No mules will be taken into objective area until cleared to do so by the Battalion CO.
- B. Forward Supply Point will be at LZ FALCON 2A022032.
- C. Equipment left at Plei Ma will be placed inside the Special Forces camp, prepared for air move to LZ FALCON or X-RAY on order.

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

- A. Battalion Commander initially with assault company.
- B. Battalion Forward Command Post: LZ X-RAY at Battalion Commander's location.
- C. Battalion Rear Command Post: Present location initially.
LZ FALCON on order.

MOORE

OFFICIAL:

LTC

/s/ DILLON

/t/ DILLON

S-3

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TAB E

Battalion Dispositions, 1400 Hours, 14 Nov


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Battalion Dispositions, 1545 Hours, 14 Nov

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



TAB G

Organization of Perimeter, 1st Night, 14-15 Nov

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RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT ROUTE

TAB C
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Capt	Company Comdr	1542	11
1 Lt	XO	1542	
1 1Sgt	First Sergeant	11G50	
1 SSgt	Supply Sergeant	76K40	
1 Sgt	Comm Chief	31F40	
1 SP4	Armorer	76K30	01
1 SP4	Company Clerk	71H20	12
1 SP4	Wheel Veh Mech	63B20	
2 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11B10	

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . . 1
Launcher grenade 40mm . . . 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 . . . 3
Telephone set TA-312/PT . . . 3
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 1

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON HQS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1542
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11F40
2 Pfc	Radio Tel Op	11B10

Radio set AN/PRC-25 2
Metascope asmbly image
infrared tranzd. 2

(3) SCOUT SQUADS

1 SSgt	Squad Leader	11F40
1 Sgt	Asst Squad Ldr	11F40
4 SP4	Sr Scout Observer	11B20 43
4 Pfc	Scout Observer	11B10 41

Launcher grenade 40mm 1
Radio set AN/PRC-25 1

MORTAR PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1543
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11C40
1 SSgt	Fire Dir Chief	11C40
3 Sgt	Forward Obs	11C40
3 SP5	Fire Dir Cmpt	11C30
7 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11C10 44

Launcher grenade 40mm 2
Radio set AN/PRC-25 8
Subd tel man SB-22/PT 1
Telephone set TA-312/PT 6

(4) HEAVY MORTAR SQUADS

1 Sgt	Squad Leader	11C40 11
1 SP4	Mortar Gunner	11C20
5 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11C10
1 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11C10

Trk platform util 1/2-T 4x4 . . . 1
Mortar 81mm on mount 1

ANTI-TANK PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

1 Lt	Platoon Leader	1542
1 SFC	Platoon Sergeant	11H40
1 Pfc	Rad Tel Op	11H10

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 1
Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 1
Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
in 1/4-T trk 1

(4) 106 RR SQUADS

1 Sgt	Squad Leader	11H40
2 SP4	Gunner	11H20
2 Pfc	Ammo Bearer	11H10
2 Pfc	Asst Gunner	11H10

Trk util 1/4-T 4x4 carrier
for 106mm rifle 8
Tlr amph cgo 1/4-T 2 whl . . . 4
Rifle 106mm on mount 8
Radio set AN/GRC-125 mtd
in 1/4-T trk 8

REMARKS

All personnel armed with rifle
5.56mm XM16E1 unless other-
wise indicated.

- 01 Also lt truck driver.
- 11 Armed with pistol automatic c
.45.
- 12 Armed with launcher grenade
40mm and pistol automatic c
.45.
- 41 Remark 12 applies to 1 EM pe
squad.
- 43 Remark 45 applies to 3 EM (1
per squad.

Reconnaissance Flight Route

Operations Order, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WRITTEN TRANSCRIPT OF 1st Bn, 7th Cav OPERATIONS ORDER

Copy # _____

HQS, 1st Bn, 7th Cav

Plei Me, RVN, ZA168069

140845 Nov 65

REFERENCE: Map, Viet Nam, 1:50,000, PLEI THE Sheet, #6551 IV

Series L701

1. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces:

- (1) Possible Battalion vic YA903032.
- (2) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mountain YA935010.
- (3) Possible secret base vic YA960020.

B. Friendly Forces:

- (1) 3rd Bde continues present mission of search and destroy.
- (2) 2nd Bn, 7th Cav south of Plei Me.
- (3) 2nd Bn, 5th Cav west of Plei Me.

- 2. MISSION.** 1st Bn, 7th Cav conducts air assault operations in area LINE (La Drang Valley) to search for and destroy the enemy. Operations will be concentrated on stream beds, river beds, and wooded high ground to a maximum height of 500 meters.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation:

- (1) Maneuver: The battalion will enter the area of operations by company elements, shuttling from their present locations using 16 UH1D helicopters, landing at Landing Zone X-RAY. Alternate Landing Zones are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only on order.

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- (2) Fire Support: There will be an 8 minute diversionary artillery preparation vic LZ YANKEE and TANGO, followed by a 20 minute artillery preparation vic the primary LZ X-RAY with emphasis on surrounding terrain and the finger and draw northwest of X-RAY. The tube artillery will be followed by 30 seconds of Aerial Rocket Artillery, followed by 30 seconds of gunship preparation just prior to touch down of the assault company. All mortars under Company D mortar platoon control. Position area to be selected after landing. Priority of fires initially to Company B, then to Company A when the move off the LZ to the east begins.

B. Company A:

C. Company B:

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D. Company C:

E. Company D:

F. Headquarters Company: Move to LZ on order utilizing
2 CH 47's..

G. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Each rifle company be prepared to assume the mission of any other rifle company on order.
- (2) "C" lift frequency will be used.
- (3) All rifle companies take one mortar and maximum ammunition.
- (4) All mortars will be brought in as internal UHID loads and placed under Company D control.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- A. No mules will be taken into objective area until cleared to do so by the Battalion CO.
- B. Forward Supply Point will be at LZ FALCON ZA022032.
- C. Equipment left at Plei Ma will be placed inside the Special Forces camp, prepared for air move to LZ FALCON or X-RAY on order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- A. Battalion Commander initially with assault company.
- B. Battalion Forward Command Post: LZ X-RAY at Battalion Commander's location.
- C. Battalion Rear Command Post: Present location initially.
LZ FALCON on order.

MOORE

LTC

OFFICIAL:

/s/ DILLON

/t/ DILLON


S-3

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TAB E

Battalion Dispositions, 1400 Hours, 14 Nov

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
BATTALION DISPOSITIONS
1400 HOURS 14 NOV

TAB E



=WOODED AREA BORDERING
LANDING ZONE

LEGEND




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Battalion Dispositions, 1345 Hours, 14 Nov

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Enemy Attacks on Morning of 16 Nov

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